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INTRODUCTION
As the population of the United States continues to diversify, the
constitutional commitment to preventing the exclusion of individuals
and groups based on religious beliefs, or lack thereof, becomes in-
creasingly important.' Both the Supreme Court and scholars have ac-
knowledged that government alignment with one religious group may
effectively exclude all others, leading to the hatred, ostracism, or per-
secution of those with contrary beliefs.2 The Establishment Clause,
which prohibits the government from making any "law respecting an
establishment of religion," aims to circumvent this danger by mandat-
ing the separation of church and state. 3
The position of the Establishment Clause-the outset of the First
Amendment 4-conveys the Clause's fundamental nature.5  The
Clause appropriately precedes all other First Amendment guarantees
because the protection it provides is essential to the rights the First
Amendment subsequently confers. 6 Government preference for one
religion (or religion generally) inhibits the freedom of expression of
those individuals who choose to practice a different religion (or none
I See Alan E. Garfield, A Positive Rights Interpretation of the Establishment Clause, 76
TEMP. L. REv. 281, 283 (2003) (suggesting that the Establishment Clause's promise to in-
clude "all members [of society], regardless of their religious affiliation or lack thereof,"
must be continually reaffirmed as the United States becomes more diverse); Shahin Rezai,
County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U.
L. REv. 503, 504 (1990) (noting the need for renewed clarity as to the meaning of the
Establishment Clause given the growing diversity of religious beliefs in the United States);
see also COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC ADvIsoRs, CHANGING AMERICA: INDICATORS OF SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC WELL-BEING By RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 4 (1998) (quantifying the increased
diversity in the U.S. population). The words of George Washington evince that this intel-
lectual dedication to inclusion has existed since the Nation's founding moment:
[I] beg you will be persuaded, that no one would be more zealous than
myself to establish effectual barriers against the horrors of spiritual tyranny,
and every species of religious persecution. . . . [Elvery man, conducting
himself as a good citizen, and being accountable to God alone for his relig-
ious opinions, ought to be protected in worshipping the Deity according to
the dictates of his own conscience.
ANSON PHELPS STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITEO STATES 495 (1950). Of course,
Establishment Clause doctrine has evolved throughout the last two centuries. Although
inclusive attitudes in the eighteenth century may have been restricted to the acceptance of
only different faiths within Christianity, modern religious tolerance is understood without
such limits and applies to "'the infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith
such as Islam or Judaism.'" See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989)
(quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52 (1985)).
2 See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-32 (1962); Garfield, supra note 1, at 292.
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4 Id.
5 See FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
11 (2003).
6 See id. at 11-12 (characterizing the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise
Clause as "mutually dependent concepts").
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at all). v As a result, government selection and approval of religion
necessarily reduces the status of these individuals to "second-class citi-
zens."8 More fundamentally, an established religion limits an individ-
ual's freedom of speech and ability to exercise religion freely by
infringing on the "freedom of conscience" necessary for even the ini-
tial development and expression of religious ideas and ideals.9
Various actions of public institutions can suggest a state's impri-
matur on religious activity and may prompt challenges under the Es-
tablishment Clause.1 0 Plaintiffs raise Establishment Clause challenges
to oppose the actions of public educational institutions with particular
frequency." This is not surprising given that the Establishment
Clause rightfully assumes great significance in the distinctive context
of public education.12 After all, public educational institutions "are by
nature places for instilling beliefs and thought"; that is, they function
as "institutions for the inculcation of values." 13 Naturally, if the ac-
tions of public educational institutions-the very institutions responsi-
ble for instilling democratic values in, and influencing the minds of,
successive generations-suggest that the government condones the es-
tablishment of a religion, then the strength of the Establishment
7 See id. at 12.
8 See id.
9 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50 (1985) (noting that an "individual's freedom
of conscience [is] the central liberty that unifies the various Clauses in the First Amend-
ment"); HAjMAN, supra note 5, at 11; Martin H. Redish & Kevin Finnerty, What Did You
Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-Educational Paradox,
88 CORNELL L. Rav. 62, 67-68 (2002). Protecting individual liberty, autonomy, and equal-
ity of citizenship, regardless of religious choice, are prominent values underlying the Estab-
lishment Clause. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text. For an extensive discussion
of these values and others that the Establishment Clause supports, see Steven H. Shiffrin,
The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. Rav. 9, 37-60 (2004).
10 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (publicly funded vouchers
to private religious schools); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (display of
religious symbols both in and outside of public buildings); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S.
664 (1970) (property tax exemption for religious organizations).
I' See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (mandate that
elementary school students recite the Pledge of Allegiance containing the phrase "under
God"); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (funding
of a religious newspaper at a public university); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 38 (moment of silence
in public schools for meditation or voluntary prayer); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306
(1952) (release of students from public school for religious instruction); People ex rel Mc-
Collum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (religious instruction in public schools); An-
derson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (mandatory chapel attendance policy for
cadets at a public military academy).
12 See Patrick F. Brown, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need to Reform Establishment
Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. Rav. 573, 573 (1986) (emphasizing that the boundaries of
permissible government religious activity are particularly controversial in the context of
public education).
13 See Julie Underwood, Public Funds for Private Schools: The Gap Between Higher and
Lower Education Widens, 41 EDuC. L. Rt. 407, 420 (1988).
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Clause and, for that matter, all of the Constitution's guarantees is in
great doubt.1 4
The long-standing aspiration of public education as an institution
designed to prepare citizens to participate in a pluralistic and demo-
cratic society1 5 further necessitates the protection of all the First
Amendment's guarantees.16 Fostering and encouraging the free ex-
change of diverse viewpoints is essential to both teaching and learn-
ing,1 7 particularly in higher education where an explicit institutional
goal is to prepare individuals for productive lives in a competitive and
diverse society.' 8 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that
"'[t]he Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to [the] robust exchange of ideas"' that occurs in higher
14 See Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. Rev. 1671,
1697 (1990) ("The extent to which we take the commitment to democracy seriously is
measured by the extent to which we take the commitment to education seriously."); Un-
derwood, supra note 13, at 420; Benjamin R. Barber, America Skips School, HARPER'S MAGA-
ZINE, Nov. 1993, at 44 (stating that democracy and informed citizenship begin with public
education); see also HAiMAN, supra note 5, at 43 ("[So many people perceive, either rightly
or wrongly, that the shaping of young minds is at stake [in the public schgols].").
15 The Supreme Court eloquently stated this point in the Court's unanimous opinion
in Brown v. Board of Education:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expendi-
tures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of
education to our democratic society .... It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in
helping him to adjust normally to his environment.
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
16 See Redish & Finnerty, supra note 9, at 67 ("If the American public educational
system produces citizens whose minds have been consciously molded in a particular man-
ner, the exercise of free expression by those citizens cannot really be free in any meaning-
ful sense of the term.").
17 See Putnam, supra note 14, at 1697 (highlighting the importance of an education
system that produces individuals who are able to think and learn both freely and critically);
John E. Walsh, College Students asLearners and Thinkers, 33J. HICHER EDuc. 324, 326 (1962)
("In one sense at least, society has set aside this period of life; it has given the student
freedom, and it has created the academic atmosphere, for the precise purpose of making
possible independent, creative, and imaginative thinking."); cf Sheila Foster, Difference and
Equality: A Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 Wis. L. REv. 105, 138 (explain-
ing that a diverse population in an educational setting cultivates educational excellence
because it results in the exchange of many different viewpbints); supra notes 7-9 and ac-
companying text.
18 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (noting the role of universities
in preparing students for professional careers in a diverse global marketplace); see also
Sarah Howard Jenkins et al., God Talk by Professors Within the Classrooms of Public Institutions of
Higher Education: What Is Constitutionally Permissible?, 25 AKRON L. REv. 289, 294 (1991)
(describing institutions of public higher education as "sanctuar[ies] for presenting, ex-
changing, and debating ideas").
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education' 9 and that religious diversity cultivates informal learning for
higher education students.2 0
Despite this strong interest in vigorously enforcing all facets of
the First Amendment in higher education, case law and dicta reveal
that courts are likely to analyze with less scrutiny potential Establish-
ment Clause violations in this context than violations arising in pri-
mary or secondary education.2 1 The courts' propensity to treat
Establishment Clause claims differently depending on the institu-
tional level is particularly apparent in one aspect of public education
that often gives rise to Establishment Clause concerns-school
prayer.22
This Note contends that the amount of protection the Establish-
ment Clause provides against prayer in a school environment greatly
depends on the level of education at which the prayer occurs. Ex-
isting case law and dicta addressing state-sponsored prayer in primary,
secondary, and higher education demonstrate that courts invariably
assume that college students are older and more mature and are,
therefore, less impressionable than primary- and secondary-level stu-
dents. 23 This assumption is dispositive to claims under each of the
traditional frameworks for evaluating Establishment Clause chal-
lenges-the Lemon test, the endorsement test, the coercion test, and
the Marsh analysis-all of which emphasize the audience's likely per-
ception of the prayer.2 4 As a result, the meaningful protection against
state-sponsored prayer which is important in all public educational
settings is lacking in higher education, and courts plausibly could in-
voke this assumption to further limit the reach of the Establishment
Clause in other contexts where the court can similarly construe the
character of the audience. It is, therefore, necessary to question both
the fundamental assumption that distinguishes between students at
different levels of education and the prominence with which the level
of education should factor into the Establishment Clause calculus.2 5
19 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (quoting Keyishian
v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
20 See id. at 312-14.
V1 See infra Part Ill.
22 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (prayer before a
public high school football game); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (prayer at a public
middle school graduation); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (prayer at a legislative
session); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer in a public school classroom); Mellen
v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (prayer before supper at a public military insti-
tute); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997) (prayer at a public university
graduation); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997) (benediction and invocation
at a public university graduation).
23 See infra Part III.
24 See infra Part IV.
25 See infra Part V.
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Part I of this Note outlines the four frameworks that courts have
historically invoked to analyze potential Establishment Clause viola-
tions. Part II describes state-sponsored prayer that can, and does, oc-
cur in higher education. Part III synthesizes the Supreme Court's
dicta implying that prayer in higher education is less threatening than
prayer in lower levels of education. In light of the central assumption
that the audience in higher education is older and more mature and,
therefore, less impressionable, Part IV argues that, except in the most
extreme circumstances, efforts to use the Establishment Clause to en-
join prayer in higher education are likely to prove ineffective regard-
less of which Establishment Clause tests or standards a court employs.
Part V describes a number of grounds upon which to question each of
the various components of this assumption and the assumption gener-
ally. This inquiry is essential to ensure, at the very least, that Establish-
ment Clause decisions concerning prayer at all levels of education are
well-reasoned. Ideally, questioning this fundamental assumption (and
thereby questioning the overwhelming focus on the level of education
in this area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence) will result in in-
creased protection in future higher education prayer cases. More
generally, this inquiry can prevent the further use of this assumption
to erode the protection of the Establishment Clause whenever it is
raised in the context of higher education.
I
JUDICIAL STANDARDS IN ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence has
given rise to a variety of tests and factors that courts have applied in
subsequent challenges. Although the three-pronged Lemon test 26 has
historically been the most prominent of the Establishment Clause
tests,2 7 courts also analyze Establishment Clause challenges using
three other factors or tests. 28 In most Establishment Clause cases that
relate to public education, courts have applied-either independently
or in combination-the Lemon test, the coercion test, and the en-
dorsement test.2 9 The coercion test considers whether individuals are
pressured to participate in a religious activity,30 and the endorsement
test focuses on whether the state intends to endorse or actually en-
dorses a religion through the activity.3 1 The Supreme Court has also
26 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
27 See Garfield, supra note 1, at 284.
28 See infra text accompanying notes 30-33.
29 See infra Part L.A-C.
30) See infra Part I.C.
31 See infra Part I.B.
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invoked the Marsh analysis when considering traditional prayers in
public institutions.3 2 And although the Court has not yet employed
this analysis in the public education context, the potential exists for
the Court to use a Marsh analysis to evaluate prayer in higher
education. 33
The use of such a variety of tests and factors raises doubt as to
whether a consistent and coherent scheme exists by which to predict
the outcome of an Establishment Clause challenge. 3 4 Many of the fac-
tors, however, are quite similar in substance, and limited Establish-
ment Clause protection against prayer in higher education thus seems
inevitable under any test or set of factors3 5 In fact, even though the
Supreme Court has voiced its refusal "to be confined to any single test
or criterion in this sensitive area,"3 6 the Court acknowledges that
the essential principle [of all of the Establishment Clauses tests] re-
mains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohib-
its government from appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in
any way to a person's standing in the political community."37
Despite this common essential principle and the "virtually inter-
changeable" 3s nature of the Establishment Clause tests, courts and
commentators still tend to consider the Lemon test, the endorsement
test, the coercion test, and the Marsh analysis as separate-though
sometimes overlapping-approaches. 39 It remains uncertain which
test a court would apply to a claim of state-sponsored prayer in higher
education; therefore, this Note considers each test in turn.
32 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); see infra Part I.D.
33 See infra Part I.D.
34 See Chelsea Chaffee, Note, Making a Case for an Age-Sensitive Establishment Clause Test,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 257, 259-60 (claiming that the Court has left the Establishment
Clause in a "mild state of confusion" by failing to overrule the Lemon test and yet not always
following it); Marilyn Perrin, Note, Lee v. Weisman: Unanswered Prayers, 21 PEPP. L. REv.
207, 252 (1993) (observing that by focusing on the psychological coercion of school prayer
in Lee, the Court created a "notoriously incoherent Establishment Clause jurisprudence")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
35 See infra Part IV.
36 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
3 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465
U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
38 Robert C. Stelle, Comment, Religious Freedom in the Twenty-First Century: Life Without
Lemon, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 657, 658 (1999).
39 See, e.g., Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003) (labeling the Lemon
test, the coercion test, and the endorsement test as the "three traditional tests" in Establish-
ment Clause cases).
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A. The Lemon Test
The three-pronged Lemon test has historically been the most
prominent Establishment Clause test 40 and remains good law today.
4 1
Courts have applied Lemon in many, but not all, 4 2 of the cases consid-
ering the validity of prayer at the primary and secondary school
levels 43 and in higher education. 44 Under Lemon, a court first consid-
ers whether the government's action has a secular purpose, 45 which is
"'a fairly low hurdle' for the state. '46 In the context of both lower and
higher education cases, solemnizing or memorializing a public occa-
sion qualifies as a secular purpose.47 Even encouraging individuals "to
reflect on and develop their own spiritual dimension" and "providing
an occasion for [Americans'] tradition of expressing thanksgiving and
requesting divine guidance" have passed the secular purpose prong.
48
A government action is not secular, however, if its "actual purpose is
to endorse or disapprove of' religion or a religious belief.49 But an
action that is only partially motivated by a secular purpose may still
pass muster, 50 and courts give a great deal of deference to the govern-
ment's professed secular purpose.5 1
40 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see Garfield, supra note 1, at 284.
41 See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314 (2000). Although
Santa Fe explicitly affirmed that Lemon is still good law, the test applied in Santa Fe, gener-
ally termed the "endorsement test," slightly alters Lemon's first two prongs and raises the
possibility that the endorsement test will eliminate traditional Lemon applications in the
future. See infra Part I.B. The Court, however, has not expressly replaced the Lemon test
with an endorsement analysis, making it necessary to consider these two analyses
separately.
42 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592 (1992) (focusing on the coercive
nature of prayer at graduation, rather than explicitly applying the Lemon test affirmed ear-
lier in the opinion).
43 See, e.g., Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 314; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 55 (1985).
44 See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371 (applying the three-pronged Establishment Clause test
developed in Lemon, in addition to the principles of coercion and endorsement, when
evaluating prayer at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI)); Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130
F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997).
45 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
46 See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372 (quoting Brown v. Gilmore, 258 F.3d 265, 276 (4th Cir.
2001)).
47 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 236; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly,
465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
48 See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 373 (internal quotation marks omitted); infra note 51. De-
spite granting deference to this secular purpose, the Mellen court did voice skepticism
about the prayer's purpose. See id. It remains significant, however, that the court could
have, but did not, strike down the prayer on the secular purpose prong. See id.
49 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50 See W. Bradley Colwell & Paul W. Thurston, Prayer and University Commencement: Ap-
plication ofLee v. Weisman, 94 EDuc. LAW REP. 1, 6-7 (1994).
51 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Mellen, 327 F.3d at
374 ("In evaluating the constitutionality of the supper prayer, however, we will accord Gen-
eral Bunting the benefit of all doubt and credit his explanation of the prayer's purposes.").
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The second prong of the Lemon test asks whether the action's
"principal or primary effect [is] one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion."5 2 Essentially, this prong evaluates whether the government
favors or endorses religion or a particular religious belief.53 Govern-
ment action that actually endorses religion violates the Establishment
Clause regardless of the secular purpose originally professed.
54
Finally, the third prong of the Lemon test examines whether the
government's action creates "excessive government entanglement
with religion." 55 This prong scrutinizes the contact between the gov-
ernment and religion or religious groups.56 Courts consider "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the na-
ture of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and the religious authority. ' 5 7 In the con-
text of higher education, courts traditionally have not considered a
university's selection of a cleric or a university's decision to include
prayer at a ceremony as excessive entanglement.58
B. The Endorsement Test
The endorsement test, first posed by Justice O'Connor in her
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, slightly alters the first two
prongs of the Lemon test and is considered by some a modification of
Lemon.59 Instead of solely focusing on the presence of a secular pur-
pose, the endorsement test scrutinizes whether the government's pur-
pose is to endorse or condemn religion.60 A government action that
has the effect of endorsing religion, whether intentional or not, vio-
lates the Establishment Clause regardless of its secular purpose. 6' In
explaining the rationale behind the endorsement test, Justice
O'Connor described an apparent government endorsement of a relig-
ion as "send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders,
not full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
52 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
53 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989).
54 See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 56 n.42 (1985) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690
(1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
55 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970)).
56 See Brown, supra note 12, at 582-83.
57 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
58 See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand,
104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997).
59 See 465 U.S. at 689-92 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stelle, supra note 38; see also
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 314-16 (2000) (applying the endorsement
test); Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MIcH.J.L. REFORM 247, 271
(2003) (discussing Justice O'Connor's reformulation of the Lemon test).
60 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
61 See id. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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political community," ultimately leading to the very political and relig-
ious divisiveness that the Establishment Clause aims to prevent.62 Al-
though Justice O'Connor announced the endorsement test in a
concurring opinion, the Court subsequently adopted the test.63 The
Court further confirmed an increasing focus on the endorsing nature
of state-sponsored prayer in the most recent Supreme Court case ex-
amining prayer in a public high school, Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict v. Doe.64
C. The Coercion Test
Though the Lemon test considers the government's purpose, ef-
fect, and involvement with religious activity, it does not explicitly con-
sider whether the government's actions actually compel religious
activity, causing courts to consider coercion separately in Establish-
ment Clause challenges. 65 Under the coercion test, if government ac-
tion "coerce[s] anyone to support or participate in religion or its
exercise," the government has violated the Establishment Clause.66
"[C] oercion has emerged as a prevailing consideration in the school
prayer context,"67 largely because pressure to conform is heightened
when "the expression of religious beliefs... carr[ies] the sanction and
compulsion of the state's authority. '68 The importance of coercive
factors in a school setting is demonstrated by the Supreme Court's
choice to rely on a coercion analysis in lower-level school prayer cases,
even where lower courts reached the same result using the Lemon
test.69 Although coercion has been a prominent concern at the pri-
mary and secondary school levels, the Court has implied that the coer-
cion test may be confined to the elementary and secondary public
school contexts. 70
62 Id. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
429-32 (1962) (outlining the effects of government endorsement of a religion).
63 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595-97 (1989).
64 See 530 U.S. at 307-08, 316.
65 See Brown, supra note 12, at 588-89. A coercion test follows logically from the Es-
tablishment Clause. Coercing religious practice conveys the message that the government
is establishing, or at least favoring, a chosen religion, which implicitly impinges upon the
free exercise of religion. See id. at 589.
66 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
67 Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003).
68 Paul G. Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools and the Supreme Court, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1031,
1046 (1963); see Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (noting that prayer in the public school context is
more likely to convey the use of the state's "machinery" to promote religion).
69 See Peter E. Barber, Bishop v. Aronov: "No Talking in Class!", Does the Elementary
School Adage Apply to University Professors, 44 AtA. L. RaV. 211, 215 (1992).
70 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 ("We do not address whether that choice is acceptable if the
affected citizens are mature adults, but we think the State may not, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, place primary and secondary school children in this position.");
David Schimmel, Graduation Prayers Flunk Coercion Test: An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 76
EDuc. L. REp. 913, 926-27 (1992).
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D. The Marsh Analysis
The analysis utilized in Marsh v. Chambers has been interpreted in
two ways, drawing on the majority and dissenting opinions in Marsh.
Some view Marsh as a narrow exception to traditional Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, 71 while others view the test as an alternative Es-
tablishment Clause analysis designed to validate government activities
that, although religious, are "deeply embedded in the history and tra-
dition of this country," such as prayer at the opening of daily state
legislative sessions.72 Given that Marsh presented a unique set of facts,
it remains unclear precisely what circumstances are necessary for a
religious practice to withstand scrutiny under a Marsh analysis. 73 The
Marsh Court plainly stated that a historical pattern alone does not jus-
tify a governmental religious activity and the Court has subsequently
invoked this analysis in a very limited fashion.7 4
The Court did not explicitly hold that the Marsh analysis applies
to public bodies other than the federal courts and legislatures 75 and
has expressly declined to engage in a Marsh analysis to validate prayers
in a high school environment.76 Despite its narrow interpretation,
Marsh remains a potential consideration in evaluating the constitu-
tionality of religious activity in higher education. In fact, the Seventh
Circuit recently invoked a Marsh analysis in allowing invocations and
benedictions at university commencements and drew comparisons be-
tween higher education and legislative settings. 77
71 See 463 U.S. 783, 796 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
72 Id. at 786.
73 See id. at 790-91 (holding that the "unique history" of legislative prayer-that the
First Congress approved the draft of the First Amendment and approved payment of chap-
lains in Congress in the same week-proved that the prayer posed no threat to the Estab-
lishment Clause).
74 See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1989) (interpreting Marsh
narrowly and stating that a historical pattern of prayer does not justify a constitutional
violation today).
75 See 463 U.S. at 783; Recent Case, Coles ex rel. Coles v. Cleveland Board of Educa-
tion, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999), reh'g denied, 183 F.3d 538, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1240, 1243
(2000).
76 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596-97 (1992).
77 SeeTanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997); Underwood, supra note 13,
at 419. But see Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F.3d 355, 370 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S.
1019 (2004). Justice Scalia even alluded to the applicability of a Marsh analysis when ad-
judging prayer in a non-legislative context by pointing out that "group prayer before mili-
tary mess is more traditional than group prayer at ordinary state colleges." Bunting v.
Mellen, 541 U.S. 1019, 1026 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); see
Anne Gearan, 2Justices Hit Court Liberals on Prayer Ban; Scalia, Rehnquist Wanted to Hear Case
From Military College, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 27, 2004, at 20 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted) (describing the controversy among the Justices over whether to grant certiorari in
Mellen).
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II
AN OVERVIEW OF SCHOOL PRAYER IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Establishment Clause doctrine has come to stand, in part, as a
guarantee that "neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Gov-
ernment will be used to control, support or influence the kinds of
prayer that American people can say," because state-sponsored prayer,
at the very least, conveys the appearance that the government is al-
igned with religion.7 8 State-sponsored prayer potentially arises when
the state countenances the delivery of religious messages or messages
invoking religious figures or deities in a public context.7 9 Naturally,
prayer that occurs in, or is facilitated by, a public institution, such as a
public school, provides fertile ground for an Establishment Clause
challenge. 0
Although the Supreme Court has extensively discussed prayer
that occurs in primary and secondary education,8 it "has never di-
rectly addressed whether the Establishment Clause forbids state-spon-
sored prayer at a public college or university. '8 2 The dearth of case
law regarding prayer in public higher education, and the fact that
only a few notable cases have challenged prayer in higher education,
reflects neither the frequency with which prayer occurs in public col-
leges or universities nor the public's interest in the propriety of prayer
in higher education. In fact, public discourse regarding the propriety
78 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429-30 (1962). Although the text of the First Amend-
ment originally placed substantive limits only on the Federal Government, the Court has
since interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to the guarantees of the First
Amendment, so as to include the states and all of their political subdivisions, including
institutions of public education. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
79 One dictionary defines "prayer" as "[a] reverent petition made to a deity or other
object of worship." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1029
(New College ed. 1980). What exactly qualifies as prayer in context is, of course, subject to
interpretation. By definition, benedictions and invocations constitute prayer; a benedic-
tion is a "prayer or scripture passage pronounced to dismiss a meeting," and an invocation
is a "prayer of entreaty that is usually a call of the divine presence and is offered at the
beginning of a meeting or service of worship." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 203, 1190 (1986). In accordance with such definitions, courts have broadly con-
sidered that any religious message, including invocations, blessings, and benedictions, can
constitute prayer. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306-07 (2000)
(classifying an "invocation" as "primarily... an appeal for divine assistance" and holding
that a school-sponsored invocation that presented a "focused religious message" violated
the Establishment Clause). A religious figure-such as a rabbi, nun, priest, minister, or
clergyman-does not have to deliver the religious message for it to qualify as prayer. See id.
at 301 (holding a student-led and initiated invocation unconstitutional).
80 See supra note 22.
81 See id.
82 Mellen, 327 F.3d at 366. Notably, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mellen on
procedural grounds. See Mellen, 541 U.S. at 1019-22, The Supreme Court also denied
certiorari in the two circuit court cases addressing prayer at universities. Chaudhuri v.
Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024 (1998); Tanford v.
Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 814 (1997).
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of prayer at universities is occurring on many levels, including within
state and federal governments, revealing the public's interest-both
for and against-this practice.83 Similar to the primary and secondary
school context, prayer in higher education may take a variety of
forms, including invocations, benedictions, and blessings. 84 Prayer in
higher education frequently occurs in the course of sporting events, 85
meals,86 school ceremonies, meetings, and commencement ceremo-
nies.87 And because "[w]e are in changing times, . . . it might be that
83 See Lyle Denniston, Justices Won't Hear Prayer Case Appeal, BosTON GLOBE, Apr. 27,
2004, at A2 (noting that twelve different states urged the Supreme Court to address prayer
at VMI by hearing Mellen v. Bunting and expressed their strong interest in allowing prayers
at graduation exercises and other traditional college ceremonies); Ariel Sabar, GOP Bill
Backs Meal Prayers, BALT. SUN, Oct. 13, 2003, at IB (describing a bill co-sponsored by twenty-
three members of the House of Representatives that would safeguard prayer at military
academies); University Debates Graduation Prayer, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2000, § 2, at 8 (stating
that the Rhode Island Senate voted unanimously in 1999 to pass a resolution urging clergy-
led invocations and benedictions at university commencements); Ohio State University
Students for Freethought @ The Ohio State University, at http://www.sffosu.org/index.
php?section=resources&resource=FAQs&page=prayer (last visited Feb. 28, 2005) (organiz-
ing Ohio State University students to speak out against official prayer at commencement).
84 See infra notes 85-87.
85 See, e.g., Bernie Lincicome, Why Legislate Religion Out of Sports, Pray Tell?, CH. TRIu.,
June 23, 2000, § 4, at 1 (describing the ritual of a former Florida State University football
coach who had the team captain lead the squad in prayer before every game); Adam
Thompson, Supreme Court Will Hear Prayer Case, DENyv. PosT, Mar. 29, 2000, at D7 (describ-
ing the lead role of Colorado University basketball coach Ricardo Patton in team prayers
before games and after practices and stating that coaches at many other public universities
practice organized team prayer). Litigation has recently ensued in Atlanta over religion
and college sports. See Jenny Jarvie & Ellen Barry, The Nation; Cheerleading Coach Finds
Prayer Not a Team Sport; Judge Says the University of Georgia Doesn't Have to Reinstate a Woman
Fired for Requiring Girls to Participate in Religious Activities, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at A23.
After being fired, a University of Georgia cheerleading coach who allegedly retaliated
against a squad member who complained about the coach's alleged religious activities-
pressuring students to attend bible study, leading prayers before sporting events, and using
the squad listserve as a vehicle for prayer requests--is suing the University of Georgia
under the" First and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. In a pending civil case, the coach
claims "that the university tolerated and even encouraged religious activity." See id.
86 See Mellen, 327 F.3d 355. VMI was not the only military institution to require prayer
before a meal; at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, all 4,200 students face disci-
plinary action if they do not attend a meal at which a chaplain leads grace. Sabar, supra
note 83. Even after the Fourth Circuit's disapproval of prayer before supper at VMI, the
Naval Academy, which also resides in the Fourth Circuit, indicated that it did not plan to
change its lunchtime ritual. See id.
87 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 233-34 (upholding nonsectarian prayer at public univer-
sity functions, including "graduation exercises, faculty meetings, dedication ceremonies,
and guest lectures"); Tanfor, 104 F.3d 982 (upholding a nonsectarian invocation and ben-
ediction by a religious leader at a university commencement); Philip Hosmer, A Different
Freedom Fight, WAsH. PosT, Aug. 17, 1994, at BI ("Many public universities use some form of
prayer at their graduation ceremonies."); University Debates Graduation Prayer, supra note 83
(describing the pressure on the University of Rhode Island to offer prayers at commence-
ment similar to those that the State's two other publicly-funded campuses offer).
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other universities sometimes in the future will contemplate adding
prayer to other mandatory activities."8
Dissenting from the Court's recent denial of certiorari in Mellen
v. Bunting, the Fourth Circuit case that invalidated daily supper prayer
at the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), Justice Scalia recognized that
"[t] he weighty questions raised by the petitioners-about the proper
application of Lee where adults rather than children are the sub-
jects [-] deserve this Court's attention .... "89 In fact, because so few
courts have yet to address prayer in higher education, states and pub-
lic colleges have been left without guidance as to whether and when
prayer is appropriate or permitted.9 0
Public colleges and universities have reached different conclu-
sions about prayer by selectively marshalling case law addressing
prayer in elementary and secondary schools or reading into the sparse
case law involving higher education.91 While some universities have
chosen to continue to permit prayer, others have discontinued the
practice, believing that their practices are unconstitutional. 92 Given
the lack of a controlling Supreme Court rule on prayer in higher edu-
cation, circuit court opinions finding prayer constitutional by distin-
guishing higher and lower education, and Supreme Court opinions
finding prayer at lower levels of education unconstitutional, confusion
remains. To provide universities with a more coherent framework for
structuring their decisions regarding prayer, it is necessary to deter-
mine the probable reach of the Establishment Clause in this context
before questioning the underlying reasoning.
III
PROVING THE ASSUMPTION EXISTS: NOTIONS ABOUT AGE,
MATURITY, AND IMPRESSIONABILITY
The current rulings regarding prayer in lower and higher educa-
tion evidence an "apparent double standard" that subjects similar
88 See Jerry Markon, VM/ Prayer Violates Constitution, Panel Rules, WASH. POST, Apr. 29,
2003, at BI (internal quotation marks omitted).
89 541 U.S. 1019, 1022 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
90 States and public colleges and universities are resolving the questions surrounding
prayer in many different ways. For instance, the Texas Attorney General argued that chap-
lain-led prayer should be allowed at public universities. See Dean Lewis, Your Turn, SAxN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Jan. 27, 2004, at 6B. Taking a very different approach, the Chan-
cellor at Southern Illinois University permitted the deans of the individual colleges to de-
cide whether to include prayer at each school's graduation ceremony. See Arn Thompson,
Forum Ends in Tie on Commencement Prayer, DAILY EGYrIAN, Apr. 26, 2002, at http://
www.illinimedia.com/di/aprO2/apr26/news/stories/campus0l.shtml (last visited Feb. 28,
2005). An informal vote among interested students as to whether the school should offer
prayer at commencement ended in a tie. See id.
91 See supra note 90.
92 See supra notes 83-87, 90 and accompanying text.
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types of prayers in higher education to less scrutiny."' For instance,
although prayer before a high school football game would violate the
Establishment Clause, even if attendance at the game were completely
voluntary,94 both the Sixth Circuit in Chaudhuri v. Tennessee and the
Seventh Circuit in Tanford v. Brand allowed prayer at technically vol-
untary university events, including graduation, faculty meetings, cere-
monies, and guest lectures. 95 Likewise, prayer delivered at a middle
school graduation by a school-selected clergyman violates the Estab
lishment Clause, 9 6 while prayer at a college graduation led by a univer-
sity-selected cleric remains acceptable. 9 7
Despite a dearth of case law directly addressing prayer in higher
education, the reasoning in cases addressing other types of Establish-
ment Clause violations in higher education, as well as dicta in cases
addressing school prayer at the primary and secondary levels, reveals
that courts are likely to scrutinize prayer differently based on the level
of education at which it occurs.98 This differential treatment is rooted
in one fundamental assumption never questioned by the courts: Col-
lege students are older and more mature and, therefore, less impres-
sionable than students in primary and secondary education. 99
The Supreme Court has cited both the age and maturity of the
prayer's audience as a justification for why instances of prayer in
higher education might demand less exacting scrutiny than prayer in
93 See Martha M. McCarthy, Student-Initiated Prayer Meetings in Public Secondary SchooLs
and Higher Education: An Apparent Double Standard, 1 EDuc. L. REP. 481, 481 (1982); Under-
wood, supra note 13, at 417 (noting a clear distinction between cases addressing the estab-
lishment of religion in higher and lower education).
94 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000) ("Even if we regard
every high school student's decision to attend a home football game as purely voluntary,
we are nevertheless persuaded that the delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper
effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship.").
95 See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 240 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand,
104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997).
96 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
97 See Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986; see also Kevin F. O'Shea, The First Amendment: A Review
of the 1997 Judicial Decisions, 25 J.C. & U.L. 201, 220 (1998) (concluding that prayer at
colleges and universities will typically withstand Establishment Clause challenges).
98 Notably, extensive jurisprudence exists addressing other types of potential Estab-
lishment Clause violations in higher education that do not involve school prayer. See, e.g.,
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (funding for
religious newspaper at a public university); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (use of
public university facilities by a religious organization); Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (mandatory chapel attendance for cadets at a public military academy).
Although it is beyond the scope of this Note to consider Establishment Clause violations
other than those involving prayer in a higher education setting, this Note's analysis invokes
particularly relevant language from other Establishment Clause challenges in higher edu-
cation to shed light on how courts generally view the higher education environment. Addi-
tionally, this Note's analysis is relevant whenever the Establishment Clause is raised in the
higher education context, whether or not the challenged action is related to school prayer.
99 See infra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
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primary or secondary education.100 On numerous occasions, the
Court has recognized university students as "young adults" that are
"less impressionable"1 01 or "less susceptible to religious indoctrina-
tion." 10 2 This perception of mature, young adults differs vastly from
the images of primary and secondary school students who face inordi-
nate pressure to conform to their peers,1 0 require parental guidance
on religious matters,10 4 and are compelled by the state to attend
school.'10 5
A close look at the circuit court opinions in Chaudhuri and
Tanford reveals that the Supreme Court's dicta distinguishing the
prayer's audience by its level of education has, in fact, constrained the
Establishment Clause's ability to restrict prayer in higher education.
10 6
In Tanford, the Seventh Circuit explicitly referenced the heightened
concern that applies to prayer in primary and secondary schools and
the "less impressionable" nature of university students. 10 7 The court
cited these considerations to support its conclusion that university stu-
dents would not feel coerced to participate in prayer and that prayer
among higher education students is truly voluntary in nature.' 0 8 The
Tanford court also noted that "the mature stadium attendees were vol-
untarily present and free to ignore the cleric's reniarks."' 0 9
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit reasoned in Chaudhuri that the audi-
ence's status as "college-educated adults" diminished the likelihood
that prayers at university events would influence observers in such a
way that would advance religion.I " The Chaudhuri court explicitly in-
voked a maturity-focused rationale grounded in the Supreme Court's
earlier statements and concluded that it would be unreasonable to
presume that college-educated adults would view such prayers as in-
doctrination or be influenced in more than a remote or de minimis
way." l l
100 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 ("We do not address whether [the prayer] is acceptable if
the affected citizens are mature adults ....
101 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14.
102 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971).
103 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000); Lee, 505 U.S. at
593-94.
104 SeeJames E. Wood, Jr., Religion and the Public Schools, 1986 BYU L. REv. 349, 368.
105 See Schimmel, supra note 70, at 927-28.
106 See 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1997); 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997).
107 See 104 F.3d at 985-86 (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981)).
108 See id. at 985.
109 Id.
110 See 130 F.3d at 237. The exact reach of Chaudhuri is somewhat unclear; although
the court's discussion of the prayer's noncoercive nature frequently references the plain-
tiff's status as a professor and "doctor[ ] of philosophy," the court's reasoning also inti-
mates that the situation would not be any different if applied to other participants at
university events, namely students. See id. at 239.
111 See id. at 238-39.
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Even Mellen v. Bunting, the only case where a circuit court de-
clared prayer in a higher education setting unconstitutional, demon-
strates the plain acceptance of the distinction that the audience of
prayer in lower education is more impressionable than its higher edu-
cation counterpart. 112 In fact, the Fourth Circuit explicitly acknowl-
edged that the "mature adult" students at VMI were more like
"children," due to the intense discipline and regulation they were sub-
jected to at VMI, than were the observers of prayer at the universities
in Tanford and Chaudhuri.' 3 This figured prominently into the
court's conclusion that VMI's prayer threatened its audience and,
thus, violated the Establishment Clause.1 14
The Supreme Court confirmed the continued viability of this dis-
tinction as a consideration in Establishment Clause analysis in the only
case explicitly addressing state-sponsored prayer aimed at adults.
Marsh v. Chambers, which upheld prayer at the opening of each Ne-
braska legislative session, did not involve prayer in public educa-
tion. 1 5 The Court, however, specifically noted that "the individual
claiming injury by the practice is an adult, presumably not readily sus-
ceptible to 'religious indoctrination' or peer pressure." 1" 6 When
Marsh's approval of prayer involving adults in the legislative context is
compared with the Court's invalidation of prayer involving impres-
sionable children at lower levels of education, it is clear that the level
of education at which the prayer occurs is a crucial factor in determin-
ing the scrutiny to which the Court will subject the prayer.'" 7
By prominently invoking age and maturity in Marsh, and subse-
quently reiterating in school prayer cases that a prayer's threat may
vary depending on the level of education at which the prayer occurs,
the Court has created a challenging environment for plaintiffs who
wish to contest state-sponsored prayer at public universities. This envi-
ronment has enabled the circuits that have thus far addressed prayer
in a university setting to forego any meaningful discussion about the
effects and concerns surrounding prayer in higher education by sim-
ply citing the age and maturity of the audience. 118 No decision-not
Marsh, Tanford, Chaudhuri, Mellen, or any lower education prayer
case-has even briefly discussed the merits of the fundamental as-
sumption that state-sponsored prayer is less threatening when
112 See 327 F.3d 355, 372 (4th Cir. 2003).
113 See id. at 371-72.
114 See id.
115 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
116 See id. at 792 (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 686 (1971)) (citations
omitted).
S17 See supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
118 See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand,
104 F.3d 982, 985 (7th Cir. 1997).
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targeted at an older and presumably more mature audience. 1t9 In
fact, "courts have used the distinction without question and applied it
even in other areas of law as a matter of judicial notice."' 120 It is particu-
larly important to note this judicial silence, given that this key assump-
tion appears to foreclose the possibility of protection against prayer in
higher education under all four of the Supreme Court's Establish-
ment Clause tests. 12 1
IV
APPLYING THE ASSUMPTION: PRECLUDING PROTECTION IN
HIGHER EDUCATION UNDER ANY TEST
OR STANDARD
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on state-sponsored
prayer at a public college or university, the Court's dicta in lower-level
school prayer cases and the approach of the three courts of appeals
that have addressed prayer in higher education reveal the difficulty, if
not impossibility, of bringing a successful Establishment Clause chal-
lenge. Prevailing doctrine acknowledges and apparently accepts-in
both dicta and case law-key differences between the environments
and audiences at varying levels of education. 122
The assumption that the audience in higher education is older
and more mature and, therefore, less impressionable, and that this
properly affects Establishment Clause analysis, is dispositive regardless
of which Establishment Clause test or standard a court employs. The
level of education is thus a focal point of Establishment Clause analy-
sis in the school prayer context. First, the Supreme Court's reluctance
to extend a coercion analysis to higher education, coupled with the
difficulty of proving coercion of young adults absent extreme circum-
stances, diminishes any likelihood of a successful challenge under the
coercion test. 123 Second, a refusal to view prayer as threatening in a
higher education setting makes it unlikely that any refuge exists under
119 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 237 (concluding that "[i]t would not be reasonable to
suppose that an audience of college-educated adults could be influenced unduly by
prayers" without any discussion); Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986 (stating that "university stu-
dents ... are less impressionable" without any further discussion (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Scholarly literature on Establishment Clause jurisprudence has also taken this
assumption for granted. For example, in one article that briefly addresses and accepts this
assumption-that older audiences are more mature and, therefore, less impressionable-
the distinction is inadequately explained away in one sentence: "One need look only as far
as the student protest movement of the 60s and early 70s to find support for this conten-
tion." John D. White, Casenote, The Fight That God (Allah, Etc.) Started, 39 S. TEx. L. REv.
165, 191 (1997).
120 Underwood, supra note 13, at 418 (emphasis added).
121 See infta Part V.
122 See supra Part III.
123 See infra Part MA.
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the Lemon or endorsement tests, as both of these tests emphasize the
audience's perception of the prayer.' 24 Finally, the remaining possi-
bility that a court might apply a Marsh analysis, which emphasizes the
age of audience members, is also unlikely to result in a successful chal-
lenge.' 2 5 The Fourth Circuit's recent decision in Mellen v. Bunting,
which invalidated daily prayer before supper at VMI, further rein-
forces the proposition that the character of the audience and the na-
ture of the university environment are dispositive factors, and that
courts will only consider offering Establishment Clause protection
against prayer in higher education in the most limited of
circumstances. 1
2 6
A. Passing the Coercion Test Barring Unusual Circumstances
The Supreme Court has invalidated prayer at lower levels of edu-
cation by focusing on the coercive aspects of school prayer, especially
where pressure from peers and others to take part in momentous
school events made it nearly impossible for dissenters to refrain from
participating in the prayer or, at least, from appearing to do so.'
2 7
The Court has specifically stated its reluctance to consider whether
coercion exists when the same situation arises in a higher education
context, and has implied that the coercion test may be appropriate
only when analyzing primary and secondary education cases. 128 Thus,
lower courts have not utilized the coercion test when assessing prayer
in higher education and are unlikely to do so. Even if a court were to
employ this test, it is unlikely to consider the traditional higher educa-
tion environment a coercive one. 129
This conclusion is premised on the presumed characteristics of
higher education previously discussed-reduced peer pressure to con-
form, a less captive and more mature audience, and a voluntary
choice to attend. 130 Courts have, without question or analysis, ac-
124 See infra Part IV.B.
125 See infra Part IV.C.
126 327 F.3d 355, 360 (4th Cir. 2003). When using circuit court cases to exemplify
treatment of prayer in higher education in the following analysis, Mellen is not always rele-
vant due to the unique nature of VMI as a military institution. The reasoning in Mellen and
the unique circumstances of VMI, however, confirm the momentum in favor of limiting
protection against prayer in higher education. See infra Part IV.B-C.
127 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310-12 (2000); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992).
128 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593; Schimmel, supra note 70, at 926-27.
129 See Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 238-39 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v.
Brand, 104 F.3d 982, 985-86 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Schimmel, supra note 70, at 926-27
("In Weisman, Kennedy has to stretch the coercion test rather far to include subtle peer
pressure and indirect psychological coercion in order even to find that middle school grad-
uation prayers violate the Establishment Clause."). But see Mellen, 327 F.3d at 371-72 (find-
ing VMI to be a coercive environment).
130 See supra Part III.
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cepted that these factors reduce the likelihood of audience indoctri-
nation.13 ' These factors weighed against a finding of coercion in both
Chaudhuri and Tanford, where attendance at the university events was
not mandatory and the "mature" attendees were "voluntarily present
and free to ignore" the prayers. 13 2 In fact, the court in Tanford even
distinguished its reasoning from Lee v. Weisman, which invalidated
prayer at high school graduation, 133 by explicitly noting a lack of coer-
cion as a result of the character of the audience.13 4
Mellen v. Bunting, the only case in which a court has found coer-
cion in a higher education setting, actually reaffirms the difficulty of
prohibiting prayer in higher education under the coercion test (ex-
cept, perhaps, in the most unique university settings).135 The Fourth
Circuit based its decision largely on the coercive factors and pressure
towards conformity that set VMI-an institution with the goal of train-
ing military cadets-apart from nearly every other university set-
ting.' 36 Cadets were forced to remain standing during the daily
prayer, which occurred before a prepaid supper that the school essen-
tially compelled students to attend. 137 Tojustify its focus on coercion,
the court distinguished the -VMI cadets from those in Tanford and
Chaudhuri, openly comparing VMI cadets to children, rather than
other higher education students.1 38
B. Undermining the Possibility of Endorsement and Prohibiting
Challenges Under Lemon
The lack of concern about coercion in higher education environ-
ments, coupled with the presumed maturity of university students,
also enables prayer in higher education to pass muster under the
Lemon and endorsement tests, both of which chiefly consider the
prayer's secular purpose and effect. 13 9 At all levels of education, the
secular purpose test is an easy one for the government to pass; a relig-
ious purpose must motivate the prayer for a court to invalidate the
131 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
132 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 239; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-86.
133L ee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
134 See Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-86.
135 327 F.3d 355; see Schimmel, supra note 70, at 926-27 (forecasting that the only
situation in which prayer in higher education might fail under the coercion test is where
evidence of "direct pressure to participate" exists).
136 See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 361-63, 371-72.
137 See id. at 371-72 (describing VMI's coercive atmosphere, which results from the
school's educational method that stresses ritual and conformity, "detailed regulation of
conduct," and a "strict moral code").
138 See id. at 371 ("Although VMI's cadets are not children, in VMI's educational sys-
tem they are uniquely susceptible to coercion.").
139 See supra Part IA-B.
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prayer under the first Lemon prong.1 40 Courts consider solemnizing a
public occasion a legitimate secular purpose, which will likely encom-
pass the majority of occasions-particularly graduation ceremonies-
at which prayer occurs in higher education.' 4' Even in Mellen's ex-
treme case of daily prayer, where VMI professed that prayer furthered
the school's academic mission and the cadets' spiritual development,
the court (albeit hesitantly) granted VMI "the benefit of all doubt and
credit" as to the prayer's purpose. 142
The dispositive nature of the assumption that prayer is less threat-
ening to an older audience is most evident under the second Lemon
prong. Like the endorsement test, this prong focuses on whether a
prayer advances or endorses religion. 143 The Supreme Court's previ-
ous statements comparing the impressionability of higher education
participants to those in primary and secondary school support the
contention that a higher education audience has a more sophisticated
understanding of when government is actually endorsing or advanc-
ing religion. 144 Regardless of this conclusion's validity, its widespread
acceptance sustains the belief that any prayer-including prayer with
which the audience disagrees-is less likely to influence participants
in higher education. 14 5
Finally, the third Lemon prong, which asks whether the govern-
ment is excessively entangled with religion as a result of prayer, re-
mains a fact-specific determination. 146 Although this prong seems less
rigid, and thus a potential factor on which a court could invalidate
prayer in higher education, Mellen conveys just how substantial the
entanglement must be for a court to find it excessive. 147 VMI's role
was only excessive because the institution "composed, mandated, and
monitored" the daily prayer. 148 Daily prayer in higher education,
however, is atypical. Even where a public university selected a clergy-
man, who sat with university officials wearing a cap and gown and was
given some instruction by the public university as to the nature of his
or her remarks, the court did not consider the government's role sig-
nificant enough to rise to the level of excessive entanglement. 149 Sig-
nificantly, the Tanford court neglected to find excessive entanglement
140 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985); Mellen, 327 F.3d at 372-74.
141 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
Chaudhuri v. Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232, 236 (6th Cir. 1997); Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d
982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997).
142 327 F.3d at 373-74.
14" See supra notes 52-54, 59-62 and accompanying text.
144 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 237; supra notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
145 See Chaudhuri, 130 F.3d at 238-39; Tanford, 104 F.3d at 985-86.
146 See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
147 See Mellen, 327 F.3d at 375.
148 See id.
149 See Tanford, 104 F.3d at 986.
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in the above-described circumstances even after the Supreme Court
declared similar school involvement at lower levels of education
inappropriate.1 50
C. Leaving Little Chance for Success Under a Marsh Analysis
In upholding daily prayer before the opening of legislative ses-
sions, the Supreme Court specifically cited the history and tradition of
legislative prayer as supporting its constitutionality.1 5 1 The Marsh
Court's focus on the "unique history" of legislative prayer seems to
render the decision an exception applicable only in cases of legislative
prayer.' 52 Because Marsh explicitly noted that the prayer's audience
was an adult one, however, the case naturally suggests that a similar
analysis might be appropriate in nonlegislative contexts where prayer
is aimed at adults and rooted in tradition. 153 Whether courts view
Marsh as an exception to the traditional Establishment Clause tests or
as a complete reconception of Establishment Clause analysis, the po-
tential remains for the application of Marsh in a manner that would
diminish protection against prayer in higher education. 154 Circuit
courts have used Marsh's reasoning when examining prayer in higher
education. 5 5 Even the Supreme Court has left open the possibility
that Marsh could apply in a nonlegislative context.
1 5 6
After dismissing the possibility that any coercion occurred at the
university commencement in Tanford v. Brand, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plicitly relied on Marsh, citing the University's 155-year-old tradition
and the national tradition of having prayer at university commence-
ments.' 57 Chaudhuri v. Tennessee also relied on Marsh, stating that
" [t]he Supreme Court has always considered the age of the audience
an important factor in the analysis."'158
More significant than the circuit courts' invocation of Marsh,
however, is that, based on the characteristics of the high school envi-
ronment, the Supreme Court has rejected a Marsh analysis when par-
150 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587-88 (1992).
151 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983). In particular, the Court noted that
the first Congress approved a draft of the First Amendment the same week that Congress
voted to pay congressional chaplains, Id.
152 See id. at 790-92.
153 See id. at 792.
154 See Mark S. Kouris, Comment, Kyrie Elaison: A Constitutional Amendment Is No Pan-
acea for the Prayer in City Council Meeting Dilemma, 1992 UT-AH L. Rgv. 1385, 1409 (claiming
that Marsh is an exception to, rather than a new formulation of, the Establishment Clause).
155 See infra notes 157-58 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 77; infra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
157 See 104 F.3d 982, 986 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Rather than being a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause, [prayer at university commencement] is 'simply a tolerable acknowledge-
ment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.'" (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at
792)).
158 See 130 F.3d 232, 239 (6th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
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ties have raised it in primary education school prayer cases.15 9 The
Court did so without mentioning that Marsh was a narrow exception
only crafted due to the unique history of legislative prayer. 160 If the
Court conceived of Marsh as an isolated exception to its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, a clear statement to that effect would have suf-
ficed to prevent Marsh's application in a primary or secondary school
prayer case. Instead, the Court compared the high school graduation
exercise to a state legislative session, distinguishing the two based on
the age of the audience, the compulsory nature of attendance, and
the formality and control required at the event.1 6 1 This comparison
suggests that the Court may still approve state-sponsored prayer in
higher education under Marsh if it considers a prayer in higher educa-
tion to be more comparable to prayer at a legislative session than
prayer at a high school graduation. The Court's repeated reliance on
the maturity of college students and the voluntary nature of college
events leaves little doubt that prayer in a higher education setting
would pass a Marsh analysis.1 62
V
QUESTIONING THE ASSUMPTION: A NECESSARY UNDERTAKING
TO INCREASE PROTECTION AGAINST PRAYER IN
HIGHER EDUCATION
By assuming that audiences in higher education cases are older
and more mature and, therefore, less impressionable-making the
level of education at which prayer occurs central to Establishment
Clause analysis-courts have virtually foreclosed the possibility of
holding prayer at universities invalid under any of the tests that courts
typically use to evaluate potential Establishment Clause violations.1 63
When such important constitutional guarantees are at stake, it is sur-
prising that the Supreme Court has perpetuated this assumption with-
out any meaningful discussion. Perhaps more importantly, the Court
has not articulated why the level of education should be a significant
factor in Establishment Clause analysis. 164 Following the Supreme
Court's cue, lower courts have also taken this assumption for granted
159 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596-97 (1992).
160 See id.
161 See id. But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 602 (1989) (noting
Marsh's reliance on the "unique history" of legislative prayer).
162 See Schimmel, supra note 70, at 926-27. Even without assuming the audience's
maturity, a constitutional violation is difficult to prove once a court commences a Marsh
analysis. The Court found the prayer in Marsh constitutional, even though the Nebraska
Legislature chose a Presbyterian chaplain to give the prayer for sixteen years, paid the
chaplain out of public funds, and the chaplain himself even characterized the prayers as
Judeo-Christian. See 463 U.S. at 793 & n.14.
163 See supra Part IV.
164 See supra Part II.
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without further discussion. 165 "The question, remains, however, if
[the] distinction [between higher and lower education] is a logical
one to draw," especially because it could lead to vastly different con-
clusions on the question of whether a state is violating the Establish-
ment Clause. 166
Prayer continues to occur at public colleges and universities, and
yet the Supreme Court has failed to rule on prayer in higher educa-
tion. 167 Given this backdrop, it is appropriate to point out the valid
bases upon which courts could and should question how relevant the
level of education at which prayer occurs is to Establishment Clause
analysis. A close look at the likely audience to prayer in higher educa-
tion reveals that the older age and greater maturity of the audience
may not be as uniform or significant as presumed, that the element of
compulsion may still be present when state-sponsored prayer occurs in
higher education, and that courts are overstating the connection be-
tween age/maturity and impressionability-even if the audience is
older and more mature, members may be no less impressionable by
virtue of their presence in a higher education environment.168 These
bases must be explored to ensure, at the very least, that courts have
adequately considered the validity of their assumptions in this impor-
tant area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Ideally, such an in-
quiry will help provide higher education students with the maximum
protection the Establishment Clause has to offer. Courts must further
undertake this critical inquiry to avoid presumptively extending this
assumption to other Establishment Clause cases that arise in higher
education.
A. Exaggerating Differences in Age, Maturity, and
Impressionability
Although the Sixth Circuit in Tanford v. Brand and the Seventh
Circuit in Chaudhuri v. Tennessee simply accepted the notion that the
higher education environment does not threaten the Establishment
Clause, there are compelling reasons to question this distinction that
is based largely on presumed age and maturity differences in the audi-
ences at different levels of education. 169 Society considers eighteen-
165 See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
166 See Underwood, supra note 13, at 418.
167 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text for background on the continuing
presence of prayer in higher education.
168 See generally Walsh, supra note 17, at 324 (discussing college students' failings as
learners and thinkers and noting "that we do not know as much about our three-and-a-half-
million college and university students as we would like to or should").
169 See Underwood, supra note 13, at 419-20 (arguing that a higher education setting is
more similar to a primary and secondary education environment than to a government
setting).
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year-olds mature enough to make many independent decisions; thus,
the age of majority seems to be a nonarbitrary way to distinguish be-
tween students. On the contrary, however, many students are in fact
still minors when they enter college.' 70 By distinguishing high school
and college students primarily on the basis that college students are
older, and thereby more mature, courts do not properly consider the
vast age variation among college students. Students progress through
the educational system at different rates, which causes significant age
variation and overlap between high school and college students.' 7 '
Furthermore, many college students are only one summer removed
from high school.1 72 To conclude without explanation that a student
can distinguish an endorsement or advancement of religion in Au-
gust, though they could not do so at their high school graduation in
June, is a questionable distinction on which to create two different
standards of Establishment Clause protection.
Commentators often refer to the "malleable minds of youth" to
explain why protection against prayer is particularly important at
lower levels of education.1 73 It is arguable, however, that students are
at the height of their ideological formation while in college, and that
their minds are more malleable than ever, which runs contrary to the
assumption courts make that college students' older age and more
developed maturity makes them less impressionable. "[S]usceptibility
[to peer pressure and coercion] does not automatically evaporate at
age eighteen."' 74 In fact, college may be the first time that many
young adults are free from extensive parental supervision or the influ-
ence of the communities and institutions that previously shaped their
lives. 175 College offers students the opportunity to explore new ideas
and ways of thinking to which they previously were not exposed, and
to decide what personal, professional, or spiritual path they will follow
170 See Karyl Roberts Martin, Note, Demoted to High School: Are College Students'Free Speech
Rights the Same as Those of High School Students?, 45 B.C. L. REv. 173, 203 (2003).
171 See Underwood, supra note 13, at 419-20. Although the example of the child prod-
igy who begins college at age twelve is an extreme example, it illustrates the different rates
at which students progress through the educational system. See, e.g., Associated Press,
Preteen Enters College as Youngest Student Ever at California College, Sept. 29, 2000, available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2000/US/09/29/young.genius.ap/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2005).
In the more frequent case, students advance at a rate slightly ahead of their peers, entering
college at age 16 or 17, which nevertheless causes a great deal of age overlap with high
school students.
172 See Underwood, supra note 13, at 419.
17" See G. Sidney Buchanan, Prayer in Governmental Institutions: The Who, the What, and
the at Which Level, 74 TEMP. L. REv. 299, 307 (2001).
174 Paul Ryneski, The Constitutionality of Praying at Government Events, 1996 DETROIT C.
L. MICH. ST. U. L. REv, 603, 626.
175 See Walsh, supra note 17, at 326 (noting that college represents the period where
students are free of "family, business, professional, and social pressures").
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as an adult.176 Regardless of their maturity or age, students in such an
environment-especially where the college or university is the only
traditional institution then present in their lives-may be particularly
susceptible to messages that favor or disfavor religion or particular
religious views, as "college students generally tend to be conformists,"
despite that their college years are the time in their lives "when they
should be most inquisitive and most daring in their thinking.
1 77
Even if a university audience is less impressionable on the whole, this
fact should not strip away Establishment Clause protection for the en-
tire audience, given the likely possibility that the audience includes
individuals who are still uncertain about their religious identity or are
susceptible to influence.1 78
B. Reevaluating the Composition of the Audience and
Compulsion to Attend
Prayer in higher education occurs at a variety of events, with
prayer at commencement ceremonies being the most frequent and
well publicized. 1 79 At graduation ceremonies and most other public
university events, the audience is not restricted and likely includes
members of all ages.1 0 Of course, the nonstudent participants at
these events may be attending the events voluntarily, which may re-
duce the Establishment Clause threat, but the age diversity remains
significant for analytical purposes.
Because of such age diversity, it is erroneous for courts to hastily
assume that the audience at university events is less impressionable
and to quickly dispose of the case based on Marsh, which upheld
prayer in the Nebraska State Legislature."" By nature, legislatures are
composed only of adults, therefore significantly reducing age diversity
among the audience. The age diversity that is undoubtedly present at
college sporting events and graduation ceremonies, then, begs the
question whether a more exacting Establishment Clause analysis-
such as that which courts apply in primary and secondary school
prayer cases-would be more appropriate for higher education prayer
cases if a portion of the audience resembles secondary and primary
school students.1 8 2
176 See id.
177 Id.
178 See Ryneski, supra note 174, at 627.
179 See supra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
180 See Ryneski, supra note 174, at 626. In fact, one plaintiff in Tanford pointed out that
her two-year-old daughter attended the graduation ceremony, thus being forced to hear
the prayer, but the district court all-too-quickly dismissed the point. See Tanford v. Brand,
883 F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (S.D. Ind. 1995), affd, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 1997).
181 See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.
182 See Martin, supra note 170, at 203.
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It is further erroneous to conclude that students' presumed ma-
turity, older age, or the general university environment makes attend-
ing commencement ceremonies, athletic events, and other
ceremonial university events more voluntary at the higher education
level than similar events at the lower levels of education. The logic
behind the Court's reasoning that high school graduation is essen-
tially compelled because "[e]veryone knows that in our society and in
our culture[,] high school graduation is one of life's most significant
occasions" certainly applies equally-if not moreso-to graduation
from higher education. 83 Graduation is a momentous event at any
level of education. And graduation from higher education logically
marks a milestone of even greater achievement than that of high
school graduation, which may actually increase the desire to attend
formal ceremonies to memorialize the occasion. Additionally, most
athletes are always compelled to attend athletic contests, regardless of
the level of education.1 8 4 Much like the high school context, then,
students and families who feel compelled to attend these momentous
events are unavoidably exposed to the prayer and "must accept expo-
sure.., as the price of such attendance."1 5
CONCLUSION
Because of the Constitution's explicit commitment to prohibiting
the establishment of religion and the relationship between the Estab-
lishment Clause and all First Amendment rights, the Court has always
considered Establishment Clause jurisprudence as an area requiring
sensitive "line-drawing."1 86 The sensitivity involved in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence should be amplified in the area of higher educa-
tion, where the free exchange of ideas, without undue government
influence over the content of such ideas, is essential to prepare stu-
dents for life in a diverse society. Dicta and case law presume, without
question, that audiences to prayer in higher education are older and
more mature and, therefore, less impressionable than audiences at
lower levels of education. This enables courts to assume that higher
education audiences have a more sophisticated understanding of
when the government is endorsing religion and are less likely to be
183 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 595 (1992) (
Graduation is a time for family and those closest to the student to celebrate
success and express mutual wishes of gratitude and respect, all to the end of
impressing upon the young person the role that it is his or her right and
duty to assume in the community and all of its diverse parts.
184 See Gil Fried & Lisa Bradley, Applying the First Amendment to Prayer in a Public Univer-
sity Locker Room: An Athlete's and Coach's Perspective, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 301, 321 (1994).
185 See Buchanan, supra note 173, at 309.
186 Lee, 505 U.S. at 598.
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coerced by prayer. Thus, except in unique and nontraditional envi-
ronments, courts are likely to find prayer in higher education permis-
sible regardless of whether they apply the Lemon test, the endorsement
test, the coercion test, or a Marsh analysis. As a result, courts are draw-
ing a clear line that validates prayer in higher education with much
less scrutiny than that which courts apply to prayer in primary and
secondary schools, while simultaneously creating an Establishment
Clause doctrine that does little to protect against state-sponsored
prayer at public universities.
Given that an unexamined assumption about the audience in
higher education is dispositive under any Establishment Clause test or
analysis, future courts addressing the issue must more thoroughly ex-
plore the bases underlying their decisions on school prayer in higher
education. After exploring the bases, courts may find that valid
grounds nevertheless exist upon which to differentiate the audience
to prayer in higher and lower education. At the very least, such explo-
ration will create a more-reasoned jurisprudence where Establishment
Clause violations in higher education are concerned, rather than a
body of law based on an unexamined assumption. Ideally, however,
the self-critical analysis advocated here will lead courts to recognize
that distinguishing lower and higher education school prayer cases
based on an assumption about the audience's age, maturity, and im-
pressionability, without rigorous analysis, is too dismissive of the fact
that all educational institutions "are by nature places for instilling be-
liefs and thought . . . [and] for the inculcation of values[,]"'187 and
that such an assumption ignores the fact that audiences at higher edu-
cation events where prayer occurs are often age diverse, that audience
members may, in effect, still be compelled to attend, and that older
age and greater maturity, if substantiated, would not necessarily make
the audience in higher education a less impressionable one than audi-
ences to prayer at lower levels of education. Upon recognizing these
shortcomings, courts should refuse to consider the level of education
as the determining factor when evaluating prayer in higher education,
thereby placing greater emphasis on the nature and character of the
government action. Only then will courts produce a truly reasoned
jurisprudence able to fulfill the promise of the Establishment Clause
at public universities.
187 See Underwood, supra note 13, at 420.
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